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SECRETS, LIES & ERISA: THE SOCIAL
ETHICS OF MISREPRESENTATIONS AND
OMISSIONS IN SUMMARY PLAN
DESCRIPTIONS
ALISON MCMORRAN SULENTIC*

INTRODUCTION

Consider four words.
Secrets.
Lies.
Omissions.
Misrepresentations.
Do these words share a common meaning? Is telling a secret
the moral equivalent of telling a lie?1 Is an omission always a
misrepresentation?'
If not - if distinguishing the secret from the lie and the lie
from the misrepresentation is a task that depends on context then let's ask another question. Who should be able to tell us
what these words mean and when it is right to use them - the
person who speaks or the person who hears? As lawyers trained
in the art of contract interpretation, we could turn to the tools that
help our profession to cope with these questions in the courtroom,
in the office and at the client's worksite. "It's a contract of

* Baker Botts L.L.P. This Article was written while I was employed as
an Associate Professor of Law at Duquesne University School of Law. Earlier
drafts of this paper were presented to the University of St. Thomas School of
Law Faculty Colloquium Series (September 2006) and the First Annual
Colloquium on Current Scholarship in Labor & Employment Law, Marquette
University (October 2006). I offer my thanks to Duquesne University for
providing a sabbatical semester during which I was able to write the bulk of
this Article and to the John Marshall Law Review for the opportunity to
present this paper in its final form. I am also grateful to Jacki Mirowitz for
her research assistance. The views set forth in this Article are my own and do
not reflect any position adopted by Baker Botts L.L.P. or its clients.
1. See, e.g., Fischer v. Phila. Elec. Co. (Fischer II), 96 F.3d 1533, 1539 (3d
Cir. 1996) (describing the duty to disclose changes in benefits after "serious
consideration" of a specific proposal to implement a change in benefits has
been undertaken by senior management with the authority to make the
change); McAuley v. Int'l Business Machines Corp., 165 F.3d 1038, 1043 (6th
Cir. 1999) (adopting Fischer II test).
2. See, e.g., Barnes v. Lacy, 927 F.2d 539, 543-44 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating
that a retirement window was a one-time only program that did not constitute
a misrepresentation simply because the employer later changed its policy to
provide a second opportunity).
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adhesion, so the language must be construed contra proferentum."
"No, there was a meeting of the minds." "She knew what she was
doing when she made this unfavorable bargain." "Of course, he
knew there was a contract - he cashed the check, didn't he?"
These are, of course, legitimate and necessary conventions that
help lawyers to figure out the terms of any contract or agreement.
But how might our understanding change if we were to lay
aside these interpretive tools for a few moments and consider the
language of contracts or disclosure statements before lawyers
begin to mediate between the reader and the text and before a
judge must listen to arguments about the correct meaning of a
text? Secrets, lies, misrepresentations or omissions - what do
these words mean to a speaker and how does the listener interpret
them?' Is it the speaker's fault if the listener does not understand
his words? Or is the listener's incomprehension somehow of his
own making?
Somewhere near the heart of these questions lies the answer
to crafting a text that meets the needs of both writer and reader to be understood and to understand. Cast in this light, a text such
as an employee handbook or a summary plan description does not
simply memorialize a business arrangement. Instead, the choice
of language and content in such a text also reveals and reinforces
a social relationship between employer and employee. Because
individual and collective decision-making in the workplace
depends in part on the appraisal of communications, the ethics of
workplace administration must address the use of language in
communications between employers and employees.4 Simply put,
3. Recent scholarship notes that deception can take many forms:
[Dieception consists of an articulated and complex communicative act
that assumes different patterns.
Different kinds of lies can be
distinguished: the prepared lie which is utilised mainly to avoid further
repercussions, the unpreparedlie which is utilised when confronted with
an embarrassing situation, the pedagogic lie, as seen, for example, in
the reassurance of a child and the white lie utilized to avoid losing face.
Consequently, we can propose the existence of a family of deceptive acts
in which truth and falsehood are not always separated by a clearly
defined line, instead they may appear in blurred or merged contexts.
Luigi Anolli, Michela Balconi & Rita Ciceri, Linguistic Styles in Deceptive
Communication:Dubitative Ambiguity and Elliptic Eluding in PackagedLies,
31 Soc. BEHAV. AND PERSONALITY 687, 688 (2003).
4. The impact of language and delivery on decision-making draws
scholarly attention to many different points of workplace relations. For
example, the receptivity of employees to subjective criticism in performance
appraisals varies depending upon the employee's identification with the
evaluator. In this context, language coming from an evaluator who shares
demographic characteristics with the employee is perceived differently from
the same language used by an evaluator who shares few similarities with the
employee. The decisions to accept or reject legitimate criticism may thus be
affected not only by the words, but by the speaker. See Kwok Leung, Steven L.
Sue & Michael W. Morris, When is Criticism Not Constructive? The Roles of
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any decision made on the basis of such communications engages
the social relationships in a workplace. 6
The construction of ordinary workplace communications is
thus inescapably tied to normative questions of social ethics.'

Fairness Perceptions and Attributions in Employee Acceptance of Critical
Supervisory Feedback, 54 HUM. REL. 1155, 1156 (2001) (identifying the
processes that "determine whether negative feedback is useful or
counterproductive").
5. See Denise M. Rousseau, Schema, Promise and Mutuality: The Building
Blocks of the Psychological Contract, 74 J. OCCUPATIONAL AND
ORGANIZATIONAL

PSYCHOL.

511,

512 (2001) (explaining that "post-hire

socialization continues the processing of new information regarding the
employment relationship and promises related to it"); Jennifer R. Dunn &
Maurice E. Schweitzer, Feeling and Believing: The Influence of Emotion on
Trust, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. COGNITION 736, 745-46 (2005) (describing
the distortion that emotion can make on judgment and providing examples
relevant to the workplace, including performance appraisals).
6. This statement reflects my agreement with Sissela Bok's defense of
applied ethics as a serious discipline. Bok herself identifies her interest in
"practical moral problems that arise in everyday life" and "how ways of
dealing with these problems express, but also shape, character and in turn
human lives." Sissela Bok, Hasting Center's Knowles Beecher Award: At the
Juncture of Theory and Practice: Remarks on Receiving the Henry Knowles
Beecher Award, (Feb. 9, 1996), in 26 THE HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 5, 8
(February 1996). I also find the contributions of Lawrence and John Jost to be
instructive. The Josts (and in particular John Jost) are prolific scholars who
have made significant contributions to our understanding of system
justification in inequitable workplace relationships. The Josts write,
As philosophers, social scientists, and citizens, we must learn to think in
more complex terms about how to: (a) expose children and adults to
environments which teach them moral values, (b) appreciate the role of
the environment in contributing to (im)moral behavior without
abdicating all forms of personal accountability, and (c) create situations
that will pull for moral rather than immoral behavior. At a minimum,
this kind of non-eliminativist situationalism means that we should
avoid creating "moral hazards" for others by placing them in situations
where there are strong temptations to lie, cheat, or steal.
Lawrence J. Jost & John T. Jost, Virtue Ethics and the Social Psychology of
Character: A Critique of Harman's 'Eliminative Situationalism,' (Stanford
Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Draft Research Paper Series No. 1595, 1999),
available at http://www.gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/ rp1595
.pdf. For further discussion of law and business ethics, see Jeffrey M.
Lipshaw, Law as Rationalization:Getting Beyond Reason to Business Ethics,
37 U. TOL. L. REV. 959, 961 (2006); Rob Atkinson, Connecting Business Ethics
and Legal Ethics for the Common Good: Come Let Us Reason Together, 29 J.
CORP. L. 469, 470 (2004) (examining the troubled relationship between law
and business). For a discussion of the contributions of social identity theory
and theories of "psychological contract" to employee relations, see Gerard P.
Hodgkinson, The Interface of Cognitive and Industrial, Work and
Organizational Psychology, 76 J.

OCCUPATIONAL

AND ORGANIZATIONAL

PSYCHOLOGY 1, 11-12 (2003) (discussing how social identity theory has been
employed as part of the industrial action analysis as well as outlining
Rouseeau's psychological contract analysis). See Lakshmi Ramarajan & Sigal
G. Barsade, What Makes the Job Tough? The Influence of Organizational
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Language is one of the strongest fibers in the social web of human
relationships.7 Whether spoken or written, language is one of the
most important ways in which a person connects to and, at the
same time, remains distinct from another person. The context in
which language may influence decision-making extends from
simple communications between a worker and his or her
supervisor to the most sophisticated statement of employment
policies. However, language may be used to convey a truth or a
falsehood.8 As the primary means of explaining an employee's
eligibility for benefits, the summary plan description offers a key
example of the problems that language may create and the course
corrections which a deeper understanding of social ethics might
suggest.
This Article examines the effectiveness of mandated
disclosures and reporting required by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").9 By no means do I
Respect on Burnout in the Human Services (forthcoming), available at
(discussing the
http://www.knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/papers/1327.pdf
impact of organizational respect on an employee's self-perception and
commitment to the workplace community).
7. For a discussion of the obstacles presented by poor communication
between health care providers and patients with disabilities, see Mar-Lynn
Drainoni, Elizabeth Lee-Hood, Carol Tobias, Sara S. Bachman, Jennifer
Andrew & Lisa Maisels, Cross-DisabilityExperiences of Barriers to HealthCare Access: Consumer Perspectives, 17 J. DISABILITY POL'Y STUD. 101, 107

(2006) (citing difficulties in communication arising from not only language
barriers, but also from hearing disabilities).
8. Part II of this Article draws on the work of Aristotle and Aquinas to
convey some of the philosophical underpinnings of "virtue ethics" in
relationship to lying. However, the focus on "virtue ethics" is not intended to
dismiss the contributions of other disciplines to our understanding of lying
and miscommunication. Recent scholarly literature on lying and deception is
vast and draws from many disciplines. See, e.g., Steve Kirby, Telling lies? An
exploration of Self-Deception and Bad Faith, 6 EUR. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY,
COUNSELLING & HEALTH 99, 109 (2003) (examining the different fields of
cognitive psychology and existential philosophy which both suggest that
"desire and anxiety reduction are key motivating factors underlying selfdeception and bad faith"); L. Bowers, Manipulation: Searching for an
Understanding, 10 J. PSYCHIATRIC & MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 329 (2003)

(summarizing psychology literature on three alternative methods used to
interpret manipulation by identifying it as "normal," "unconsciously
motivated," or the result of "cognitive distortion").
9. For additional scholarship on ERISA's disclosure requirements, see
Lorraine A. Schmall, Keeping Employer Promises When Relational Incentives
No Longer Pertain: 'Right Sizing' and Employee Benefits, 68 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 276, 317-25 (2000); Lorraine A. Schmall, Telling the Truth About Golden
Handshakes: Exit Incentives and FiduciaryDuties, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POLY
J. 169, 199-204 (2001). As with many aspects of ERISA scholarship, the
contributions of practitioners in the form of continuing legal education
materials should not be overlooked. See, e.g., Pamela D. Perdue, The Evolving
Area of ERISA Disclosure, 2 A.L.I. - A.B.A COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS

1

(October, 2001) (explaining that one of the purposes of ERISA was to confirm
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challenge the importance of full disclosure of plan terms and the
benefits of employee education concerning employee benefits. But
I do question whether the obligation to explain the terms of an
employee benefit plan in a "summary plan description" (or, in
benefits lingo, an "SPD") really accomplishes the purpose of
providing workers with the information they need in order to
Even bolstered by ERISA's strict
make informed decisions?
fiduciary standards, disclosure does not guarantee complete
information or insure effective communication.
Part I of this Article describes ERISA's current requirements
for the disclosure of the terms of employee benefit plans and
locates the function of the SPD in what Judge Posner has dubbed
"ERISA Land."'0 Part II addresses the practical consequences of
modern SPD drafting techniques in terms of modern scholarship
Part III endorses an
on lying, secrecy and social ethics. 1'
that both beneficiaries and participants knew of their rights); Wilber H. Boies
& Nancy G. Ross, Communicating with Employees about Benefits: A Central
Issue in ERISA Administration and Litigation, 30 INST. ON EMP. LAW 487,
491 (2001) (intending to provide lawyers as well as "plan administrators with
guidelines for better communications with employees regarding benefits plans
and plan changes.").
10. Justice Posner has used this phrase at least twice. See Health Cost
Controls of Ill., Inc. v. Wash., 187 F.3d 703, 712 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting
confusion that arises in "ERISA land" from a series of documents not clearly
labeled); Operating Eng'rs Local 139 Health Benefit Fund v. Gustafson
Constr. Corp., 258 F.3d 645, 655 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that a ban on
contractual penalties should not extend into ERISA land).
11. Lying and truthfulness are issues that often occupy the attention of
legal scholars. For additional legal scholarship on lying, see Thomas L.
Shaffer, On Lying for Clients, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 195, 196 (1996)
(arguing that one must accept that a certain amount of lying is required in
client representation); Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery:
Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 776 (1997) (exploring
investigative lies); Robert P. Mosteller, Moderating Investigative Lies by
Disclosure and Documentation, 76 OR. L. REV. 833 (1997) (analyzing the broad
characterization of existing rights designed primarily to protect the innocent);
Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Of Fine Lies, Blunt Instruments and Predictability:The
Right to Lie in Business Acquisition Agreements (2006) Tulane Public Law
Research Paper No. 06-0000, available at http://www.ssrn.comlabstract
=900021 (discussing the law of fraud as an omission or half-truth; Reed
Elizabeth Loder, Moral Truthseeking and the Virtuous Negotiator, 8 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 45, 47 (1994) (stating types of deception as well as providing an
ethical framework with which to identify and analyze both legal and non-legal
situations involving deception); Daniel J. Morrissey, Moral Truth and the
Law: A New Look at an Old Link, 47 SMU L. REV. 61 (1993) (exploring
dissatisfaction with the legal system and its distance from its essential
purpose of justice); Anita L. Allen, Lying to Protect Privacy, 44 VILL. L. REV.
161, 161-62 (1999) (identifying lying that lurks behind public perspective);
Diane H. Mazur, Sex and Lies: Rules of Ethics, Rules of Evidence, and Our
Conflicted Views on the Significance of Honesty, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. Ethics &
Pub. Pol'y 679 (2000); William H. Simon, Virtuous Lying: A Critique of QuasiCategoricalMoralism, 12 GEO. J. OF LEGAL ETHICS 433, 463 (1999) (positing
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alternative reporting structure that would rely upon commonly
agreed and shared definitions and a more uniform method of
disclosure of benefit plan terms. I argue that these techniques
should facilitate better decision-making by plan participants by
enabling them to rely on certain terms with uniform meanings and
on formats that will permit them to more readily recognize and
understand plan terms.
I.

DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS UNDER ERISA

"[A] sign's a kind of a tease," Augustus said. "It ought to make a
man stop and consider just what it is he wants out of life in the next
few days."
- LARRY MCMURTRY, LONESOME DoVE.
In calling a sign "a kind of a tease," Augustus McCrae is well
within the boundaries of modern contract law. Any law student
who is ready to pass the bar should be able to tell you that some
statements are simply affirmations of value that do not have
enough substance to be promises or warranties. Something more
complete - more reliable, more substantive - is necessary in
order to transform words into promises.
Just as a sign hanging outside a grocery store cannot tell you
everything about the procedure within, a summary plan
description generally is not a complete statement of the terms of a
plan.
The SPD is more than a "tease," but less than a
comprehensive plan document. 2 The purpose of the SPD is to
inform participants of their rights and duties under a plan in a
manner that permits them to understand the essential elements of
the plan's structure.
A. Statutory Goalsfor SPDs
When Congress enacted ERISA more than thirty years ago,
improved communications between plan sponsors and plan
participants figured so prominently among its goals that the
importance of disclosure occupies a central place in the
introduction to the statute:
[O]wing to the lack of employee information and adequate
safeguards concerning their operation, it is desirable in the interests
of employees and their beneficiaries, and to provide for the general
welfare and the free flow of commerce, that disclosure be made and
that when honesty and important values conflict, honesty should not always
prevail).
12. See, e.g., Louderback v. Litton Indus., Inc., No. 06-2023-JWL 2007, WL
2404255, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 23, 2007) (powerpoint slides reflecting highlights
of benefit program did not include required elements and "is so lacking in any
detail that it cannot be deemed a summary plan description.").
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safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, operation,
and administration of such plans. 3
ERISA establishes a system of reporting and disclosure that relies
on four basic strategies.
First, a plan must provide a satisfactory response to a
participant's legitimate request for information.
If the
participant wants to see the plan document, the plan
administrator must hand it over."
Second, even if a participant does not want or does not seek
information, a plan administrator must provide him with a
Summary Plan Description. 5 The Pension Protection Act of
2006 also requires that individual benefit statements be
distributed on (1) a quarterly basis for individual account
plans that permit participants to direct their own
investments, (2) at least annually for individual account
plans that do not permit participant-directed investments
and (3) at least once every three years for defined benefit
plans. 6
Third, the plan administrator must provide notices at
specific times during the participant's life. 7 The most wellknown example of these notices is probably the COBRA
notice that informs participants in a group health plan of
13. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000).
14. See 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(2) (2000) (explaining that copies of updated
SPD and other plan instruments are to be available for examination by a plan
participant); 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4) (2000) (declaring that upon written
request, administrator must furnish a copy of latest SPD and plan
instruments to plan participant). See, e.g., Reddy v. Schellhorn, No. 05 C 639,
2006 WL 642647, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2006) (ordering an employer who
failed to respond to request for copy of severance plan document to pay $20.00
per day for each of the 511 days of noncompliance).
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) (2000) (requiring SPD to be furnished to
participants); § 1024 (b) (dictating timing and manner of distribution of SPD
to participants); see, e.g., Haynes v. K-VA-T Food Stores Inc., No. Civ.A.
104CV00096, 2006 WL 1933313 at *3-4 (W.D. Va. July 13, 2006) (holding that
plan administrator breached its fiduciary duty by failing to provide SPD to
employee). But see Exarhakis v. Visiting Nurse Serv. of N.Y., No. 02-CV-5562
(ILG), 2006 WL 335420, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2006) (stating "this Circuit
requires a threshold showing of '"likely prejudice' where an ERISA claim is
premised on incomplete or inaccurate information").
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 1025(a)(1) (2000) (explaining that this was amended by
the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 508 (2006)); see also
Memorandum from Robert J. Doyle, Director of Regulations and
Interpretations, to Virginia C. Smith, Director of Enforcement, Regional
Directors, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employee Benefits Security Administration
Field Assistance Bulletin (Dec. 20, 2006) (discussing changes to ERISA).
17. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-l(a) (2007).
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the opportunity to continue coverage for a stated period of
time.18
However, notices are required in many other
situations as well. 19
* Fourth, ERISA requires a significant amount of information
to be filed with government offices (primarily, the
Department of Labor, although many plans are also subject
to additional filing requirements under the Internal
Revenue Code)."
Common sense suggests that clarity, accuracy and veracity
should be among the attributes of any writing intended to inform
its readers. In describing the general properties of an SPD,
however, Congress did not rely solely upon the common sense of
the inhabitants of ERISA Land. Instead, the statutory text makes
its objectives very plain. An SPD:
[S]hall be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the
average plan participant, and shall be sufficiently accurate and
comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and
beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan.21

The statutory text thus provides the basis for evaluating the
substantive information provided in a text (does it "reasonably
apprise" participants of their rights?) and the manner in which
this information is conveyed (is it "written in a manner calculated
to be understood by the average plan participant?").
Section 102(b) of ERISA provides an extensive list of the
information that must be included in an SPD.22 In rough terms,

18. 29 U.S.C. § 1166 (2000).
19. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(3)(A) (2000) (stating the requirements for
notice of right to make an election to waive the qualified joint and survivor
annuity distribution option; § 1169(a)(5)(A)(i) (stating that notification must
be made to participant and alternate recipients of plan administrator's receipt
of a medical child support order). For a useful summary of the many notice
and reporting requirements under ERISA, see Department of Labor Employee
Benefits Security Administration, Reporting and Disclosure Guide for
Employee Benefit Plans (August 2006) (noting, however, that the publication
had not been updated for the Pension Protection Act), available at
http'//www.dol.gov/ebsa.
20. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1023 (2000) (explaining requirements for filing
annual report); § 1024(a)(1) (timing for filing of annual report).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) (2000).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) (2000). For the required contents of a summary
plan description, see 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) and 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3 (2007).
While a plan administrator is required to provide an SPD, an employee should
not assume that any communication about the plan may substitute as an
informal SPD. See Miehls v. Henkel Corp., No. 04-CV-72287-DT, 2005 WL
1639443, at *4 (E.D. Mich. July 13, 2005) (holding that a plan brochure that
did not meet the basic requirements of an SPD and clearly referred to a plan
document could not serve as an SPD); see also Gridley v. Cleveland Pneumatic
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this list can be broken down into six categories:
" information that should assist a participant in locating the
plan sponsor and the fiduciaries who are charged with the
administration of the plan, as well as the agent for service
of process;23
" instructions on how a participant may obtain copies of the
plan document and, if applicable, a related collective
bargaining agreement; 24
*technical information concerning the type of the plan
(pension or welfare benefits), the nature of its
administration (such as third-party administration,
insurance, self-insurance,
etc.) and the plan's funding
25
arrangements;
" an explanation of the requirements for eligibility to
participate in the
plan and eligibility to receive benefits
26
under the plan;
" a description of the benefits provided under the plan and
any limitations or exclusions that might be applicable to a
claim for benefits; 27 and
* a statement notifying participants of their rights and
obligations under ERISA. 8
These requirements have grown increasingly extensive over the
years, due in part to the implementation of subsequently enacted
Co., 924 F.2d 1310 (3d Cir. 1991) (ruling that an overview booklet that does
not contain required information is not an SPD). See generally Donald R.
Saxon, An Unpleasant Surprise: The Unrealized Responsibility of Employers
Who Sponsor Fully Insured Welfare Benefit Plans, 9 HR ADvISOR: LEGAL &
PRAC. GUIDANCE 27 (2003) (stating that "while the certificates of insurance
typically provided by HMOs and health insurance carriers provide a lot of
valuable information ...they do not rise to the dignity of an SPD").
23. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3(b)(1)-(4),(f)-(i) (2007).
24. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-l(b) (2007); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3(i) (providing a
collective bargaining agreement).
25. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3(d)-(e).
26. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3(j).
27. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3(1).
28. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3(t). A recent opinion from the Northern District
of Georgia underscored the importance of this provision when it awarded
$32,400 in statutory penalties to a claimant who had not received notice of her
rights under ERISA, while simultaneously upholding the denial of her claim
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Palmeri v. Coca-Cola, Inc., No.
1:01-CV-3498-TWT, 2006 WL 2523027, at *6-8 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2006).
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laws such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIPAA)"9 and in part to the Department of Labor's
response to a 1997 report by the President's Advisory Commission
on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry"°
and the 2005 reports of the ERISA Advisory Council on
communications regarding employee benefit plans.31
Of course, error, deceit or thoughtless editing may cause an
SPD to omit some required information. 2 Ticking off each element
in the list of information required in an SPD demands arduous
In substance, the required list is so
attention to detail.
comprehensive that the task may require little creativity in
deciding whether to address a topic or to omit it. In many
instances, the statute simply makes the answer clear.
The more challenging assignment is to create an SPD that
provides the required substantive information while achieving the
more elusive goal of writing "in a manner calculated to be
3
The Department of
understood by the average plan participant.""
Labor regulations suggest that decisions concerning how the SPD
is to be written are fiduciary matters in which "the plan
administrator shall exercise considered judgment and discretion."34
The regulations advise the plan administrator to consider "such
factors as the level of comprehension and education of typical
participants in the plan and the complexity of the terms of the
plan"35 and to eschew the practice of "exaggerating the benefits or
The Department of Labor
minimizing the limitations. "3"
specifically encourages "the limitation or elimination of technical
jargon and of long, complex sentences, the use of clarifying
examples and illustrations, the use of clear cross-references and a

29. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104191 (1996); see also 45 C.F.R. § 160.101-160.552 (2006) (containing the HIPAA

Administrative Simplification regulations).
30. See President's Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and
Quality in the Health Care Industry, httpJ/www.hcqualitycommission.gov
(last visited March 19, 2007).
31. ERISA Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Plans,
Report of the Working Group on Health and Welfare Benefit Plans'
Communications (November 2005), available at http://www.dol.gov; ERISA
Advisory Council, Report of the Working Group on Communications to
(November
2005), available at
Retirement Plan Participants

http://www.dol.gov.
32. See, e.g., Greeley v. Fairview Health Services, 479 F.3d 612 (8th Cir.

2007) (deciding a case where an SPD contained a typographical error that
indicated that benefits would be payable until age sixty-seven, when in fact
the cut-off date was age sixty-five).
33. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-2(a) (2007).

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-2(b).
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table of contents." 7 Neither the size, style nor prominence of
typographical fonts, nor the relative positions of language
describing what is and what is not covered in the plan escape the
Department of Labor's notice. 8 Administrators of plans that cover
employees who, in significant numbers, are not literate in English
must comply with additional regulatory requirements in order to
inform the employees of their rights.39 If the details of a regulation
are in any way proportionate to the problem that the regulation
addresses, then difficulty in understanding SPDs must be very
great indeed.
B. Draftingthe Tactical and PracticalSPD
A close look at the process used to construct an SPD may
reveal systemic shortcomings that explain the deficiencies of the
SPD and the social consequences of these defects in the workplace.
Despite this Article's focus on the failure of many SPDs to inform
participants of their rights in a meaningful way, it is important to
note that these problems do not necessarily emerge as the result of
bad faith on the part of the plan sponsor or plan administrator.
Breakdowns in communication may result from externalities such
as the potential for legal damages or the barriers posed by poor
literacy rates. Changes in the wider economy may also create
circumstances to which a previously adequate SPD cannot
respond.
Moreover, in some cases, it is possible that
miscommunication arises from a poor fit between the participants'
own perception of their employee benefit needs and the media
through which the employer has elected to provide those benefits."
Viewed from this broader perspective, the problematic SPD
reflects an equally problematic legal, economic and social climate
that exceeds the confines of the employer-employee relationship.
Extracted from this larger context, a faulty SPD might seem to
suggest employer malfeasance. In some cases, this certainly might
be the most accurate explanation for discord between the
participant and the plan administrator.
If so, an effective
resolution of the ethical problem stemming from an inaccurate
SPD may indeed be confined to rectifying an employer's deviant
behavior. However, this narrow perspective hides the very real
possibility that the source of confusion has little to do with an

37. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-2(a).
38. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-2(b).
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., James Kalamas, Gene Kuo and Drew Ungerman, Designing
Better Employee Nenefits: Adopting a Product Developer's Approach to
Designing a Benefits Package can Help Employers get More Value from their
Health Care Investments, THE MCKINSEY QUARTERLY: THE ONLINE JOURNAL
OF MCKINSEY & CO. (June 2005), available at http://www.mckinsey
quarterly.com.
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employer's intentional wrongs and may be found instead in
systemic weaknesses that cannot be corrected by assigning blame
to one party.
In order to pave the way to an endorsement of standardized
language as a tool to improving workplace communications, this
section of the Article provides a brief overview of the compelling
empirical evidence that participants do not understand their SPDs
and identifies some of the weaknesses that allow such
misunderstanding to creep into the process of drafting an SPD.
1.

The Problem:Literacy and Complexity

In 1998, President Clinton received a report from the
President's Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and
Quality in the Health Care Industry that suggested that
communications between plan sponsors and plan participants had
not improved in the twenty-four years since ERISA was passed.4'
of Insurance
Association
National
the
In
2004,
Commissioners commissioned an in-depth survey of twenty-four
randomly selected people, who differed in geographic, educational
and ethnicity.42 According to the study, consumers "indicated
limited understanding of the insurance disclosures they read."'
Even among those who said they understood part or all of the
disclosures, subsequent comments often revealed "how limited
Moreover, members of the
their understanding actually was."
focus group who read the disclosures reported feeling frustrated,
intimidated, and/or "irritated and indicated that reading the

41. President's Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality
in the Health Care Industry, Quality First: Better Health Care for All
Americans (1998), available at http://www.hcqualitycommission.gov/finall (last
visited March 19, 2007). One commentator writes,
From the standpoint of business ethics, false or misleading advertising
is universally regarded as immoral and illegal. For pharmaceutical
products, however, 'truth in advertising' is hampered by the nature of th
einformation, which is cloaked in arcane scientific language and
adorned with impenetrable and often misleading or erroneous statistical
data. In the absence of transparency, pharmaceutical 'truth' has become
socially constructed by physicians, pharmacists, and even lawyers and
juries who are legally empowered to serve as the translators and
interpreters of this otherwise inscrutable, if not unreliable, information.
Ronald F. White, Direct-to-ConsumerAdvertising and the Demise of the Ideal
Model of Health Care, XI THE INDEP. REVIEW 223, 233 (Fall, 2006).
42. See James J. Bason & Mary Ann Mauney, University of Georgia Survey
Research Center, National Association of Insurance Commissioners Insurance
Disclosure Focus Group Study (2005); see also Brenda J. Cude, NAIC
Disclosure Guidelines and Process, Draft of September 6, 2006, available at
www.naic.org/documents/committees-d-cpwg naic-disclosure-guidelines-proc
esscudecomments.
43. Id. at 3.
44. Id.
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disclosures ' made them feel less confident as insurance
consumers. 4.
The frustration reported by the participants in this very
limited survey is consistent with the findings of an October 2006
study on the "readability" of SPDs that was conducted by the
Employee Benefit Research Institute.4 '6 Literacy scholars report
that forty-three percent of Americans score at or below the basic
literacy standard, which is defined as the ability to read and
understand sentences.47 The EBRI research team conducted an
empirical examination of the SPDs for forty plans to determine the
level of "readability" of SPDs.'
The team concluded that the
average "readability" of SPDs assumes a reading level equivalent
to that of a first-year college student.4 9 Moreover, a comparison of
the readability scores of all of the SPDs in the study indicated that
the most easily comprehensible SPDs were pitched to a ninth
grade reading level, while the most complex SPDs assumed a
reading level characteristic of a college graduate." What makes
these statistics particularly disturbing is the researchers' warning
that readability assessment cannot predict comprehension. 5 In
other words, a person may be capable of reading a document and
still fail to understand its contents.
2.

The DraftingProcess

If the results of these empirical studies are correct (and
anecdotal information provides every reason to believe that they
are), then the confusion surrounding SPDs must stem, at least in
part, from the ways in which an SPD is drafted. Three possible
points of weakness in the drafting process are (1) the dominant
role of the plan administrator and the insignificant role of plan
participants in the drafting process; (2) the possibility that several
parties will independently review and adjust the draft SPD in
ways that complicate the final text; and (3) the possibility that
artful drafting techniques will add to the difficulty of the text
without an offsetting clarification of its terms.

45. Id.
46. Colleen E. Medill et al., How Readable are Sumary Plan Descriptions
for Health Care Plans, 27 EBRI NOTEs (October 2006), available at
http://www.ebri.org.

47. Id. at 2.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[40:731

a. Weaknesses in SPD Drafting (1): Participants Do Not
Participate
Here is a truism well-known throughout ERISA Land: Plan
beneficiaries rarely (if ever) participate in drafting SPDs.
This
practice
is certainly
pragmatic
and
largely
understandable. First, the legal responsibility for issuing an SPD
lies with the plan administrator, whose duty of loyalty is owed to
the plan participants - plural."
An individual participant's
interests and goals may differ from those of the plan as a whcle
and the plan members as a group. The plan administrator's duty
to the entire group of plan participants may suggest priorities that
differ from individual needs. Second, the possibility of litigation
against the plan requires the plan administrator to consider
assuming or overseeing the role of the plan as potential
defendant.'
A plan administrator may well enjoy significant
latitude in determining just how much defensive language makes
its way into the SPD.' Limiting the number of people who receive
and review drafts should also reduce the possibility that
participants might place an unwarranted faith on representations
that appear only in a draft document.
In contrast to these defense-friendly strategies, a participant
is more likely to envision the role of a potential plaintiff with a
claim against the plan. Indeed, the very purpose of the SPD is to
provide the plaintiff with notice of the benefits due to him under
the plan.55 Moreover, the Department of Labor requires that each
SPD include a notice of the participant's rights under ERISA.56
This information is provided to the participant so that he or she
can take the steps necessary to enforce his rights - a goal very
different from the defensive concerns of the party whom a wronged
beneficiary is likely to sue.5 7
However, the pragmatic decision to limit the drafting process
to include only the plan administrator and the plan's service
providers does come at a price. Without active participation by

52. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000).
53. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000) (detailing procedures for civil
enforcement).
54. See generally, Saxon, supra note 22 (detailing the roles of employers

and administrators).
55. 29 U.S.C. §1022 (2000).
56. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3(t) (2007).
57. Frizzell v. Raytheon Group Life Ins. Plan illustrates the problem that a
beneficiary may face when the SPD fails to provide such information. In
Frizzell, an SPD did not describe the effect of divorce on a spouse's enrollment

in a welfare benefit plan. The Northern District of Texas ruled that the plan
administrator's denial of life insurance benefits was incorrect because the SPD
did not state whether divorce from the participant effectively terminated the
spouse's participation in the plan. Frizzell v. Raytheon Group Life Ins. Plan,
No. 3:06-CV-0313-G, 2007 WL 507043 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2007).
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plan participants, a plan administrator may find it difficult to
determine whether an SPD is in fact readable by the plan
participants.& In theory, an extraordinary scrupulous plan
administrator might make a considerable financial outlay in order
to obtain an outside opinion on the "readability" and
comprehensibility of the document. However, such expenditures
remain, at best, uncommon, and, even if such a course were
undertaken, the prospect of success seems obscure. It remains far
more likely that an SPD will be reviewed for accuracy and
defensive language than for clarity and comprehensibility.
b.

Weaknesses in SPD Drafting (2): Too Many Cooks

There are certainly many ways to produce an SPD.
following are four common practices:

The

" The "Hey, Big Spender" approach: A consultant designs
the plan document and SPD. The SPD is reviewed by a
third-party administrator (if any), by in-house decisionmakers (usually by legal, human resources and possibly
public relations), and is then reviewed by outside counsel.
" The lawyers control the world approach: Outside counsel
writes the SPD, which is then reviewed by in-house
decision-makers and other relevant parties.
* The insurers control the world approach: A service
provider, such as an insurer or TPA writes the SPD,
followed (one hopes) by review by in-house decisionmakers and outside counsel.59
" The budget approach: In-house decision-makers write the
document and (again one hopes) counsel reviews it.
As each of these scenarios suggests, the job of drafting an
SPD may fall to the lot of a person whose area of expertise does
not necessarily coincide with the substance of the relevant plan or
the practices in a particular industry. For example, a person who
is responsible for writing or reviewing an SPD may not be an
expert in the complex conditions alluded to in a medical plan SPD.
A lawyer who has a solid grounding in employment law may not
have an equal facility with the intricate tax regulations concerning
pension distribution provisions. While external service providers
and in-house public relations employees may provide valuable
58. See Medill et al., supra note 46 (explaining the high level of reading
required to understand an SPD).
59. See, e.g., How Aetna Can Assist Plan Sponsors to Comply with New
Summary
Plan Description (SPD) Requirements, available at
http://www.aetnaushc.com/about/pdf/dolAetnaAssistance802.pdf (describing
techniques for plan sponsors to issue SPD's that comply with the requirements
of ERISA).
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insight into the drafting process, the opportunities for inaccuracy
are still present. Inconsistencies that arise in this manner are not
necessarily the result of incautious language or negligent
judgments. They represent instead the opportunity cost of a
particular drafting strategy in which a variety of service providers
influence an outcome.
c.

Weaknesses in SPD Drafting (3): Artful Drafting 101

Drafting a legally compliant SPD that conceals as much as it
discloses is such a simple exercise that even a hackneyed phrase
such as "artful drafting" seems too pompous to describe the work.
Instead, what one lawyer decrees as artful drafting, another may
consider to be very good evidence of his or her duty to anticipate
and to minimize the client's potential liability.
Here is a simple example. Look at one of your own SPDs and
see if you can find a statement that your employer reserves the
right to amend the terms of the plan at any time, with or without
notice. How many secrets or omissions might hide behind that
statement? How much confidence will you place in your SPD?
What might someone who is not schooled in the details of ERISA
law make of this phrase? And yet, if a "reservation of rights"
clause is a part of the governing plan document, then including it
in the SPD is only prudent and a failure to do so would rightfully
be considered a failure of candor.'
In the alternative, an SPD might be drafted with such
attention to detail and with such loyalty to the terms of the
controlling plan document that the SPD itself becomes
incomprehensible."' An SPD that goes to extreme lengths in
disclosing each and every piece of information that might be
remotely relevant to its operation certainly cannot be said to be
incomplete or to lack candor. But what if the average reader
cannot understand it, or does not have the time or patience to read
it? What if the drafter's assessment of the reading skills and
knowledge base of the plan participants outstrips their reality? A
"tell-all" SPD might also fail to inform the worker who reads it.

60. See, e.g., A Summary Plan Description of XYZ Sample Company Profit
Sharing 401(k) Plan, http://www.benefitplans.com (stating that "[alithough
the Plan is intended to be permanent, the Employer can amend or terminate
the Plan at any time.").
61. In 1997, Pensions & Investments awarded the 1997 Defined
Contribution Investment Education Award to Rank America for its humorous
The
and colorful investment education materials for Hard Rock Cafes.

winning materials defined an SPD as "'a boring book with lots of important
legal stuff.'" Fred Williams, Humor, Dazzling Graphics Garner Awards,
3,
1997),
available at
&
INVESTMENTS
(February
PENSIONS

http://www.pionline.com.
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The significance of the SPD is not lost on the federal courts. 2
As the Third Circuit stated in Burstein v.AHERF, "[t]he SPD is
the document to which the lay employee is likely to refer in
obtaining information about the plan and in making decisions
affected by the terms of the plan. " ' Likewise, the courts seem well
aware of the danger of an inaccurate, incomplete or
incomprehensible SPD. Just how the federal common law of
ERISA should deal with this problem remains more obscure.
One approach to a dispute that turns on a difference between
an SPD and a plan document is to favor the terms of the SPD
Several
when they are more generous to the participant.6
traditional principles of contract and trust interpretation
strengthen this argument. Courts sometimes turn to the notion
that an ambiguity in a contract must be construed against the
drafter."b Moreover, courts are not likely to forget (and plaintiffs
will surely remind them) that the plan administrator is
responsible for the dissemination of the SPD to plan participants.'
Both fiduciary theory and arguments rooted in law and economics
suggest that the plan administrator is best placed to prevent an
error in the summary plan description, thus tipping the scales in
favor of the plan participant.67 Although claims of detrimental
reliance and promissory estoppel have met with uneven fates over
the years, it is also possible that a sense of justice - or perhaps
just desserts - may lie within some decisions that give the terms
of the SPD priority over the conflicting terms of the plan
document.'
62. See, e.g., Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny
Health Educ. and Research Found., 334 F.3d 365 (3d Cir. 2003).
63. Id. at 378 (holding that "where a summary plan description conflicts
with the plan language, it is the summary plan description that will control").
64. See, e.g., Weis v. Accidental Death & Dismemberment Benefit Plan of
Kaiser Found. Health Plan Inc., 442 F. Supp. 2d 850, 853 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(holding that "[tihe SPD's more generous language could reasonably create
different expectations than the more onerous language of the Policy").
65. See, e.g., Collinsworth v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 2d 911, 916-17
(N.D. Tex. 2005) (ruling that "[tihe rule of contra proferentum that applies to
ambiguous policy terms applies with equal force to ambiguous terms in the
summary plan description").
66. 29 U.S.C. § 1021 (2000).
67. See, e.g., Frizzell, 2007 WL 507043 (denying motion for summary
judgment).
68. In Burstein, 334 F.3d at 380-81, the Third Circuit recognized that it
parted company with some of the other circuits in ruling that a plan
participant need not prove reliance in order to claim benefits on the basis of a
conflict between an SPD and a plan document. Thus, in other jurisdictions, a
plaintiff who is unable to show detrimental reliance on an erroneous SPD may
not be successful in persuading a court to honor the terms of the erroneous
SPD, rather than the terms of the accurate plan document. See, e.g., Greeley
v. Fairview Health Services, 479 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 2007) (dealing with an
SPD that contained a typographical error that indicated that benefits would
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This type of jurisprudence generally bodes ill for the sponsor
or fiduciary of an employee benefit plan. Plan sponsors who
encounter this approach know that the SPD's terms may prevail
even when the plan document clearly states that the terms of the
plan document control any dispute. Moreover, a conflict between
the SPD and the plan document is almost always raised when the
terms of the SPD favor the participant, for the practical reason
that plaintiffs are less likely to build their arguments on the
strength of an SPD if the conflicting plan document actually
provides a more favorable basis for their claim.
At least two drafting techniques have emerged in response to
the practical problems encountered by plan sponsors who find that
that their SPDs have run afoul of their plan documents. The first
approach is to draft the SPD in a manner that minimizes the
participant's reliance on its terms. This strategy might best be
described by recalling the adage that "the best defense is a good
offense." A fully executed strategy might involve several tactics:
first, the use of words such as "may" rather than "shall"; second,
repeated references to the sole discretionary authority of the plan
fiduciaries to interpret ambiguous terms and supply missing
terms; third, the inclusion of a clause that describes the employer's
reservation of the right to amend the plan at any time, with or
without notice; and fourth, the inclusion of the now familiar
"Circular 230" language that reminds document readers not to rely
on any representations as tax advice.69 The purpose of each of
these tactics is to discourage the participant from actual or feigned
reliance on the content of the summary plan description. A
barebones SPD that incorporates these features may leave the
participant in some confusion about the content of his benefit
plans."0

be payable until age sixty-seven, when in fact the cut-off date was age sixtyfive); see also Fitzpatrick v. Porter Cable Corp., No. 06-0385(DRD), 2006 WL
1084089, at* (D.N.J. April 26, 2006) (explaining that plaintiffs reliance on
advice of human resources director was unreasonable when the plain terms of
the SPD were unambiguous and erroneous advice was given more than one
year prior to eligibility for plan benefits).
69. See generally David Pratt, Standards of Practice for Pension
Practitioners,39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 667, 684-99 (2006).
70. These strategies can, of course, be undertaken without any intentional
bad faith. However, the use of such techniques is also consistent with a
"packaged lie in a formal situation," as described in the work of Luigi Anolli,
Michela Balconi and Rita Ciceri of the Center for Communication Psychology
at the Catholic University of Milan. Anolli et al., supra note 3, at 688. In
reviewing previous research on linguistic styles associated with "packaged

lies," this team found numerous and sometimes conflicting observations of
techniques associated with lying, including:
"an ambiguous and equivocal speech style" with "a scant number of
factual utterances," the use of leveling terms such as "all" or "nobody,"
the selection of varying word choices and "a greater use of irrelevant and
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The second approach sometimes adopted by plan sponsors
might be called the "kill them with kindness" strategy. A plan
sponsor might prefer to rely upon an SPD that so fully explains
the terms and conditions of the plan that it is almost
indistinguishable from the plan document itself. In some cases,
the SPD actually does serve as the plan document, thereby
collapsing any distinction between the functions of a governing
document and a summary description.
The Eighth Circuit's 2007 opinion in Administrative
Committee of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Associates' Health and
Welfare Plan v. Gamboa noted that Wal-Mart "attempted to
eliminate ERISA land confusion in identifying the plan
documents" by establishing a "plan wrap document" that set forth
the general terms of the plan and incorporated by reference each
"welfare program" established by the employer. 7' The court also
stated:
[A] written arrangement that is offered by one or more Employers
and incorporated into this Plan by identification in Appendix A and
which provides any employee benefit that would be treated as an
'employee welfare benefit plan' under Section 3(1) of ERISA if
offered separately.72
While Appendix A listed an arrangement, "Wal-Mart
Associates' Group Health Plan," the self-funded group health plan
operated without a contract or a specific "written arrangement" as
defined in the plan wrap document. 73 The court endorsed the plan
administrator's decision to treat the summary plan description as
the plan document.74 The court's willingness to accept the SPD as

misleading information";
a "reticient and elliptic linguistic style by reducing the information
content of the utterance to a bare minimum" and reliance on language
that is "concise," "brief," "incomplete" and "typically assertive"; or
linguistic "depersonalization" which permits "the interlocutor... [to]
avoi[d] responsibility for his/her own utterances, shifting the
communicative focus to external cues of the context" and which is
characterized by "the use of the impersonal 'one' and of the plural 'We.'"
Anolli et al., supra note 3, at 688-89. The research team's own investigations
considered lying as "a two-way relational game" that varies depending on
whether the interlocutor is "an able or naive liar" and whether the recipient is
"a victim or... a probing agent."
Id. at 708. They concluded that
interlocutors who interacted with a "compliant and truth-biased hearer" were
"verbose and repetitive.., in an effort to be believable and persuasive," while a
"suspicious and lie-biased recipient" evoked in the interlocutor a "concise,
indirect and assertive" style of speech that avoided "supplying the required
information." Id.
71. Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assoc.' Health and Welfare
Plan v. Gamboa, 479 F.3d 538, 542 (8th Cir. 2007).
72. See id. (citing appellant's appeal).
73. Id. at 543.
74. Id. at 544.
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an integral part of the plan document was made easier by two
factors. First, the SPD stated that "portions of the book serve as
part of the official plan document."" Second, the difficulty of
locating and identifying a plan document is all too familiar to
courts that have examined sadly disorganized writings with the
difficult task of discerning which, if any, might be the plan
document.
Citing the Second Circuit's opinion in Feifer v.
PrudentialInsurance Co. of America,6 the Eighth Circuit warned
that refusing to treat the SPD as the written documentation
required under ERISA would create a "nonsensical" incentive to
employers to evade ERISA's mandates simply by arguing that no
plan could exist in the absence of a formally designated plan
document."
The "kill them with kindness" strategy offers substantial
advantages in terms of clarity and completeness. Such an SPD
deters arguments that a participant did not know about a
particular feature of a plan by providing detailed explanations of
each medical procedure covered under a health plan or an in-depth
explanation of the manner in which a pension benefit is calculated.
The fast-paced changes in medical technology can make this a
difficult assignment with regard to a health-care plan, although
this problem can usually be resolved by relying on "catch-all"
language to address future scientific developments.
A more
extreme version of this general approach might suggest drafting a
single document that could serve both as SPD and plan
document.8
Neither the "best defense" approach or the "killing with
kindness" approach necessarily falls short of the standard of legal
compliance. It is also probable that, for some participants, neither
writing style will respond to any real need for information. If
there are limits on the terms of the plan, then a participant who
reads an SPD written in the style of the "best defense" certainly
should know about it. Likewise, the "killing with kindness" SPD is
not unlike the owner's manual to a vehicle; the reader might not
want to know all of the information that it contains until he or she
needs it. When the reader does need it, this second kind of SPD
can prove to be a reassuring resource.

75. Id.
76. See Feifer v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 306 F.3d 1202, 1208 (2d Cir.

2002) (holding that ERISA was structured so that plans would be governed by
written documents).
77. Gamboa, supra note 71, at 544.
78. B. David Joffe, Are Your Welfare Benefit Plans in Order? BOULT,
CUMMINGS, CONNERS & BERRY, PLC, Mar. 23, 2006, http://www.
boultcummings.com/Publications/detail.aspx?id=f664ceae-b3ff-48ad-ba86-

0087c7e45bf5.
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The practical problem with writing and reading an SPD,
however, is that the statutory mandates are two-fold. First, the
SPD has to provide adequate content for which it provides specific
guidelines, and second, it must do so in a manner that is
comprehensible. 9 Combined with the systemic problems associated
with the drafting process, ERISA's lack of clear guidelines on what
it means for an SPD to be comprehensible may reinforce the
tendency of drafters to respond to their perceptions of external
threats in a way that is more likely to reflect the interests of the
plan sponsor and the plan administrator in defending the plan.
II. LYING, SECRETS AND SOCIAL ETHICS

[H]e was trying to figure out how to lead that noble and meaningful
life and coming to the conclusion that some deception was
necessary.
- DAN O'BRIEN,

BUFFALO FOR THE BROKEN HEART.

A. Communication Challenges in General
1. Purpose of Communication:Social Relationship
and Social Ethics
Any meaningful discussion of social ethics must begin by
exposing the normative values by which a given society governs its
relationships.
It is possible, for example, that normative
assumptions in different societies may produce very different
ethical judgments with regard to very similar problems. In the
United States, for example, the positive law set forth in ERISA
and its related regulations is obviously one source that informs
norms in workplace ethics. There are also unwritten cultural
norms that govern relationships between employers and
employees. The ethical meaning and assessment of any particular
problem will necessarily vary in accordance with the stance one
adopts towards normative goals.
Philosopher Sissela Bok has argued that it is possible to
identify a minimum set of core values that are common to most
human societies - in her words, "a limited set of values so down-

79. The work of Yuval Feldman and Alon Harel on the relative efficiency of
promulgating generalized standards versus specific rules goes some way
towards explaining the difficulty in enforcing the requirement that SPDs be
comprehensible. Feldman and Harel argue that where policy seeks to enforce
behavior that is contrary to social norms, legislation will be more effective
when it sets forth specific rules. In contrast, "[s]tandards provide people with
more room to interpret reality in a way that supports their self-interest."
Yuval Feldman & Alon Harel, Social Norms and Ambiguity of Legal Norms:
An Experimental Analysis of the Rule v. Standard Dilemma, in STANDARDS,
RULES AND SociAL NORMS 20 (2006), availableat http://www.ssrn.com.
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to-earth and so commonplace as to be most easily recognized
She proposes three
across societal and other boundaries."0
categories of values that must be addressed in order for any group
of people to function in community: (1) "positive duties regarding
mutual support, loyalty, and reciprocity"1 ; (2) "negative duties to
refrain from harmful action" 2 ; and (3) "norms for at least
rudimentary fairness and procedural justice in cases of conflict
Bok argues
regarding both positive and negative injunctions. "'
that these "minimalist moral values" can serve as the "basis on
which to build negotiation and dialogue about how.., they are
honored" and the "criteria and a broadly comprehensible language
for critique of existing practices."8 Bok writes of trust as a "social
good" and argues:
Trust is the prime constituent of the social atmosphere. It is as
urgent not to damage that atmosphere by contributing to the
erosion of trust as it is to prevent and attempt to reverse damage to
our natural atmosphere. Both forms of damage are cumulative;
both are hard to reverse.... When trust is damaged or decimated,
through violence, dishonesty, betrayal, injustice, or the failure to
nurture the young and those in need, these relationships suffer.5
The effort to identify and to affirm common values makes it
possible for the members of different groups to trust one another.
In some ways, ERISA regulates the disclosure of the terms of
an employee benefits plan with a similar emphasis on the
importance of establishing "trust" and mutual understanding
between the plan sponsor, the plan administrator and the
Because the relationship between narrator and
participant.'
80. SISSELA BOK, COMMON VALUES 1 (Univ. of Mo Press 2002).

Bok

understands that "[tihe very possibility of a common basis or foundation for
morality, long debated throughout the history of philosophy, has been
increasingly challenged in recent decades." Sissela Bok, What Basis for
Morality? A Minimalist Approach, 76 MONIST 349, 350 (July 1993). Instead
of demanding "absolute guarantees or unanimity," a "minimalist approach...
seeks out the values that are in fact broadly shared." Id. at 353. Bok argues:
A basis for morality thus interpreted calls for no extrahuman or
superhuman guarantees of objectivity or absoluteness. It offers, rather,
a common groundwork or footing upon which to undertake dialogue,

debate, and negotiations within and between otherwise disparate
traditions: a set of values that can be agreed upon as a starting point for
negotiation or action.
Id. at 354.
81. BOK, COMMON VALUES, supra note 80, at 13.
82. Id. at 15.
83. Id. at 16.
84. Id. at 19.
85. Id.
86. For a discussion of the importance of trust law concepts for the
protection of ERISA plan participants, see Schmall, supra note 9, at 279
(suggesting a legislative solution). For a discussion of the nature of trust and
the extent to which a breach of trust may be rectified, see Maurice E.
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reader is also a relationship between fiduciary and beneficiary,
any ethical analysis of an SPD must take into account the social
relationship between these parties. Even the most benign SPD
implicates the central concerns of social ethics - such as the
question of what defines the right relationship between people if only because human beings can manipulate and misunderstand
the language in which the SPD is written. Looking at the SPD as
a problem for social ethics recasts the problem of accuracy in
summary plan descriptions in a different mold. If we look at
mistakes and misrepresentations in an SPD as a social ethics
problem, can we find a social ethics response?
The SPD, like any other document, is a means of
communication between a narrator and a reader.' Unlike a novel
Schweitzer, John C. Hershey & Eric T. Bradlow, Promises and Lies: Restoring
Violated Trust 101 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION
PROCESSES 1 (2006) (discussing trust issues).
87. Misunderstandings can also arise simply because a speaker assumes
that his listener has greater information than is actually the case. A recent
study by communications specialists Shali Wu and Boaz Keysar of the
University of Chicago produced the following conclusions:
The more information participants shared, the more they used their own
knowledge. This facilitated communication when they talked about
shared objects, but increased confusion with information that was
privileged to the directors. High-overlap directors [speakers whose
knowledge of a topic significantly overlapped with the knowledge of
their listeners] used more object names that were privileged compared
to low-overlap directors, and high-overlap addressees were more
confused than low-overlap addressees when trying to identify objects
that were privileged to the directors. This shows that increase in
knowledge overlap could benefit communication globally but could also
introduce local inefficiencies.
Shali Wu & Boaz Keysar, The Effect of Information Overlap on
Communication Effectiveness, 31 COGNITIVE SCIENCE 169, 177 (2007).
88. Recent work on the literary analysis of business texts is especially
helpful on this point. Daphne Jameson advocates "increasing awareness of
the difference between the writer's implications and the reader's inferences, a
distinction often overlooked in analyses of both literary and nonliterary
texts."See Daphne A. Jameson, Implication Versus Inference: Analyzing Writer
and Reader Representations in Business Texts, 67 BUS. COMM. Q. 387-88
(2004). She explains:
The implied writer is the writer's self-representation in the text. The
whole live human being who writes is never exactly the same as the
implied writer because it is impossible and unnecessary to convey all the
elements of a person's character, personality, roles, and values in a
given text ....
The implied reader is the writer's expression of who the intended reader
is. The whole, live human beings who read a text are not the same as
the qualities the writer attributes to them.
Id. at 388. Complementary paradigms (inferred writer, inferred reader)
describe the reader's assessment of the text. Thus, Jameson's work suggests
that attentiveness to the "implied writer" and the "inferred writer" of an SPD
will reveal both the persona that the drafter has adopted and evoke the
reader's assumptions about the trustworthiness of this narrative voice.
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or a newspaper article, however, the SPD's function is not simply
to entertain or to provide a daily update of current events.89 No
one reads an SPD for pleasure or for daily news flashes. Unlike a
contract, the SPD is not a collective expression of an agreement
between equally placed consenting parties.
The plan
administrator and the participant do not bargain together to
create language that meets their mutual needs. Instead, the
function of the SPD is to provide and explain information about
the benefits that the narrator must provide to the participants
under the terms of a plan. This particular communication,
therefore, does not memorialize an exchange between narrator and
reader, but instead constitutes the fulfillment of the narrator's
fiduciary obligation to the reader.'
The SPD does not simply
create or acknowledge a relationship between the narrator and
reader. Instead, the SPD performs an essential function of that
relationship - the duty of the narrator to act in the best interest
of the participant by informing him or her of the terms of the
plan."
The remainder of this section considers the practical
applications of trust as a social good in light of the reflections of
Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Sissela Bok on veracity and lying.
Each philosopher examines the complexity of communication in
light of its social consequences. Bok recognizes Aristotle and
Aquinas as fellow travelers in the search for moral choice," and

89. See id. at 388-89 (describing "[tihe process by which readers interact
with a text, become aware of the writer behind the words, and participate in
the creation of negotiated meaning is similar whether that text is a business
report or bildungsroman, memo or melodrama, e-mail or elegy.").
90. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000) (containing Congressional findings
and declarations of policy relating to the fiduciary duty addressed by ERISA).
91. It would be a mistake to regard the fiduciary function of the plan
administrator solely as a product of ERISA's mandates. In addition to any
requirements of ERISA, empirical research suggests that workers value
employer-provided health insurance precisely because they believe that they
would not be able to obtain comparable benefits on their own, even if they
were to receive replacement income or cash contributions towards the
purchase of health insurance. See Paul Fronstin, The Tax Treatment of Health
Insurance and Employment-Based Health Benefits, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 295, EMP.
BENEFIT RES. INST., Wash. D.C. June 2006, at 10. Moreover, workers
expressed little confidence in their ability to make the best choice of health
plans without the employer's participation in the decision. Id. at 21. The
same report suggests that workers may be skeptical that they would actually
receive cash income in replacement of health benefits. Id. at 13. Each of these
observations suggests that even if ERISA did not mandate a fiduciary
relationship, workers who are covered by employment-based health plans
would nonetheless look to their plan sponsor or plan administrator to act as
agents by negotiating with insurers on their behalf.
92. Bok, supra note 6, at 8; see also Sissela Bok, Lowell Lecture: The
Pursuits of Happiness, (Oct. 14, 2003), available at http://www.pbs.org/now
society/happiness.pdf (discussing views of human happiness against the

2007]

Secrets, Lies & ERISA

expands their discussion to address modern business and
professional ethics. Her work deliberatively explores the effect of
lying, secrecy and other challenges in communications on social
relationships in our modern world. In a New York Times review of
Bok's 1983 book entitled Secrecy, Richard Sennett observed,
The aim of [Bok's] book is to fashion an ethics of secrecy - when it
is justified, when it is not. Like the California Supreme Court in the
Tarasoff case, she is disposed to think that secrecy must end when
public peril begins. What makes "Secrets" complex, however, is the
author's acknowledgment that legal definitions of proper and
improper secrecy will always miss the psychological and, indeed,
theological rationales for secrecy.... Basically, this book argues
that there is a break between secrecy in private and in public. What
makes secrecy important as an interior experience cannot therefore
easily be used to justify professional, military or governmental
secrecy.93
It is in Bok's recurrent insight - that legal definitions do not
always account for psychological or moral (in Sennett's words,
"theological") considerations - that I hope to find the beginnings
of solution for the problem of miscommunication in employee
benefits.
2. Problems in Communication:Aristotle and the Social Context
of Virtue and Vice
The social or relational ethics of communication is not a
strictly modern concern. ' Aristotle, for example, includes veracity
among his list of virtues and specifically presents its
characteristics in the context of human relationships.95 Thomas
background of human suffering, poverty, desease, and the inevitability of
death); see also Beth Potier, Sissela Bok Stalks the Notion of Happiness;
Presents 'Field Notes' from Travels Through Happiness Studies, HARVARD

(Oct. 16, 2003) (reporting on Bok's public lecture on her academic
work on "happiness"), available at www.hno.harvard.edu/gazette
/2003/10.16/19-bok.html.
93. Richard Sennett, Light on a Dark Subject, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1983, at
3.
94. Bok writes:
Over the past decades, I have witnessed the growth and the increased
sophistication of different domains of practical or applied ethics, such as
those of medical or legal or engineering or government ethics. The study
of practical ethics had paled into insignificance in American higher
education in the first half of this century, after having been central to
classical and medieval education, as well as to the academic curriculum
in many societies up through the first half of the nineteenth century.
Many of the greatest thinkers-Aristotle, Confucius, and Aquinas
among them-had taken for granted that the study of ethics concerned
how we would live our lives and best deal with the moral problems we
encountered.
GAZETTE

Bok, supra note 91, at 8.
95. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1127a13-1127b32

(Roger Crisp ed.,
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Aquinas, in his detailed Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean
Ethics, observes that Aristotle's discussion of "amiability" and
"veracity" marks a turning point between his analysis of the
virtues in relationship to "external things" and the more dynamic
consideration of "the virtues that relate to human actions."' Thus,
Aristotle's understanding of both amiability and its close cousin,
veracity, touch on the general area of (in Aquinas' words) "liv[ing]
agreeably with others [through] proper actions in particular
cases."97 Aristotle himself notes that the "nameless" mean between
obsequiousness and quarrelsomeness (a mean that Aquinas refers
to as amiability9") bears a "remarkable resemblance to friendship,"
although it lacks friendship's "passion or affection for people with
whom we associate.""
A person whose habits are amiable
"approves what he should and also disapproves what he should"
and "act[s] similarly with strangers, intimates, and outsiders.""°
Aristotle locates his discussion of veracity in the same realm
of social relations as amiability (and, by implication, friendship). 1 '
Veracity concerns the "manifest[ation of] truth and falsehood by
words, operations, and pretense." °2 A truthful person "seems to
observe moderation, for he is a lover of the truth, and, being
truthful where it makes little difference, he will speak the truth
all the more where it does matter.""3 Aquinas observes that
Aristotle's understanding of the virtue of truthfulness touches on
social habits; a truthful person tells the truth with the aim of
"living pleasantly with others, not by reason of love but by reason
of its habit."10 4 Thus, veracity contributes to the right ordering of
social relationships by a proper habit of truth-telling, while
boasting or false modesty distorts the possibility of "living
pleasantly with others."
Aristotle's concern over the social cost of lying and
misrepresentation reflects his belief that the habit of virtue was
the central method by which people, individually and collectively,
would achieve happiness. If veracity contributes to the possibility
of social happiness, then boasting, false modesty and lying

Cambridge University Press, 2000) (350 B.C.).
96. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE'S NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS 816 (C. I. Litzinger, O.P. trans., Dumb Ox Books, 1993) (c. 1270).
97. Id. at 823.
98. Id.
99. ARISTOTLE, supra note 95, at 1126b11, 1126b20-22. For an excellent
discussion of the possible legal implications of "friendship" and an insightful
discussion of Aristotle's perspective, see Ethan J. Lieb, Friendship& the Law,
54 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2007).
100. ARISTOTLE, supra note 95, at 1126b16-19, 1126b22-26.
101. Id. at 1127a13-14.
102. Id. at 1127a17-20.
103. Id. at 1127b3-7.
104. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 96, at %838.
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threaten the ability of individuals and groups to reach that goal.
In The Politics, Aristotle notes, with some piquancy, "[Pleople
suppose that it is sufficient to have a certain amount of virtue, but
they set no limit to the pursuit of wealth, power, property,
reputation and the like."'0 ' In Aristotle's view, such an attitude is
shortsighted because "it is not by means of external goods that
men acquire and keep the virtues, but the other way round.""6 He
writes:
[Tihe life which is best for men, both separately, as individuals, and
in the mass, is the life which has virtue sufficiently supported by
material resources to facilitate participation in the action that
virtue calls for.' °7
In other words, lack of attention to the virtues jeopardizes
individual well-being, impoverishes social relationships and,
ultimately, the stability of the state.
Willfully abandoning the pursuit of virtue also seems to have
social overtones. Lying, like other deviations from virtue, comes
most easily when:
people think that they can themselves most easily do wrong to
others without being punished for it if they possess eloquence, or
practical ability, or much legal experience, or a large body of friends,
or a great deal of money.1°s
While this belief may be ill-advised, it reflects the wrong-doer's
consciousness of living in social relationships and his implicit
understanding that deviations from virtue lead to "doing wrong to
others."
3. Problems in Communication:Aquinas and
the Taxonomy of Lying
Thomas Aquinas saw "truth" as having two meanings. First,
truth may be regarded as "a certain equality between the
understanding or sign and the thing understood or signified.""0
This definition presents "truth" as a fact that is measurable by
observation. Second, "truth may stand for that by which a person
says what is true, in which sense one is said to be truthful.""1° This
explanation of "truth" and "truthfulness" describes a virtue,
understood by Aquinas to be a habit that tends towards the good.

105. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS
1981) (c. 335 B.C.).

1323a14 (T.A. Sinclair trans., Penguin Books,

106. Id. at 1323a38.
107. Id. at 1323b36.
108. ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, 1372a10-15 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., Franklin
Library, 1981) (c. 335 B.C.).
109. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Q. 109, A. 1 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province, trans., Christian Classics, 1981) (c. 1275).
110. Id.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[40:731

Aquinas' explanation of lying is more complex. He takes
pains to distinguish between falsehood and lying. Three factors
bear upon whether a statement is a lie or a falsehood: "the
falsehood of what is said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally
the intention to deceive." Thus, Aquinas distinguishes between
intentional falsehoods designed to deceive another party and
falsehoods that result from error or mistaken assumptions. He
explains:
[Tihe essential notion of a lie is taken from formal falsehood, from
the fact, namely, that a person intends to say what is false;
wherefore also the word mendacium (lie) is derived from its being in
opposition to the mind. Consequently if one says what is false,
thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not formally,
because the falseness is beside the intention of the speaker: so that
it is not a perfect lie, since what is beside the speaker's intention is
accidental, for which reason it cannot be a specific difference. If, on
the other hand, one utters a falsehood formally, through having the
will to deceive, even if what one says be true, yet inasmuch as this is
a voluntary and moral act, it contains falseness essentially and
truth accidentally, and attains the specific nature of a lie.ii
While the Summa Theologica clarifies Aquinas' disdain for lying,

he does distinguish between "telling a lie in order to deliver
another from any danger whatever" (which he sees as unlawful)
and the lawful practice of hiding the truth "prudently" by "keeping
it back.""'

Aquinas saw both aspects of truth-the verifiable fact and the
disposition toward the good-in social terms. He wrote:
Since man is a social animal, one man naturally owes another
whatever is necessary for the preservation of human society. Now it

would be impossible for men to live together, unless they believed
one another, as declaring the truth one to another. Hence the virtue
of truth does, in a manner, regard something as being due.
Likewise, in theological terms, Aquinas sees lying as sinful not
only because of "its inordinateness," but also because of the injury
to "one's neighbor." " 4
This understanding of truth and lies reveals interesting
consequences for the kind of statement that promises future
action. Consider Aquinas' views on whether promises must be
kept:
A man does not lie, so long as he has a mind to do what he promises,
because he does not speak contrary to what he has in mind: but if he

does not keep his promise, he seems to act without faith in changing

111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

Q.110,A.1.
Q.110, A.3.
Q.109, A.3.
Q.110,A.3.

Secrets, Lies & ERISA

2007]

his mind. He may, however, be excused for two reasons. First, if he
has promised something evidently unlawful, because he sinned in
Secondly, if
promise, and did well to change his mind.
circumstances have changed with regard to persons and the
business in hand. For, as Seneca states, for a man to be bound to
keep a promise it is necessary for everything to remain unchanged:
otherwise neither did he lie in promising-since he promised what
he had in his mind, due circumstances being taken for granted-nor
was he faithless in not keeping his promise, because circumstances
are no longer the same.""
4. Ethical Parametersfor Measuring Communication Choices:
Sissela Bok
Sissela Bok has written extensively on lying, secrecy,
deception and other aspects of moral choice. Her best known book
Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life appeared in 1978
(well before the corporate scandals of the present day but not that
long after Watergate)." 6 She followed this book with Secrets: On
and Revelation in 1983 and, more
the Ethics of Concealment
7
Values.1
Common
recently,
In each of these works, Bok treats lying and secrecy as
individual acts with profound consequences for the larger
community."' Her interest in this topic began with a study of
placebo prescriptions in clinical health care settings. She observed
that many physicians "talk about such deception in a cavalier,
often condescending and joking way, whereas patients often have
an acute sense of injury and a loss of trust at learning that they
have been duped.""9 In her words, "For [the patients] to be given
false information about important choices in their lives is to be
rendered powerless. For them their very autonomy might be at
Surely, no plan administrator has ever created a
stake."'
"placebo" employee benefit plan, but the communication between
physician and patient suggests a direct parallel to the
between the plan administrator and a plan
communication
21
participant.

115. Id. at Q.110, A.3.
116. SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE

(Pantheon Books, 1979).
117. SISSELA

BOK,

SECRETS:

ON

THE

ETHICS

OF

CONCEALMENT

AND

REVELATION (Pantheon Books, 1982); SISSELA BOK, COMMON VALUES
(University of Missouri Press 2002).
118. BOK, supra notes 116, 117.
119. Id.
120. Id. at xvii.
121. See, e.g., Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of DoctorPatient Discourseand the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U.L.
REV. 201 (Mar. 1994) (examining many aspects of doctor/patient
communications).
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One of the critiques of Bok's work is that she is long on theory
and short on solutions. 22 This critical approach would sum up her
work as "lying is bad, so don't do it.""' I have to admit a certain
sympathy with Bok's position, however, even when it is stated in
such an unnuanced and reductionist way.
Here, Aristotle,
Aquinas and many more modern commentators would agree with
her. Lying is bad, and most of the time we probably should not do
it, so why not say so? Certainly, Bok recognizes that some lies
serve a social utility, but her general arguments do emphasize a
moral choice or call to virtue that is not easily accomplished
through legislative demands. 24 Indeed, Bok's more recent work
suggests a discomfort with attempts to arrogate to one person or
party the ability to define terms "for what is and is not social wellbeing.""' Moreover, Bok's work also contemplates a more critical
role for the person who hears a statement that may or may not be
a lie. In a 1999 speech to a gathering of journalists, Bok preached
in favor of the "good, old-fashioned editorial virtue" of
"incredulity,"
which she called "indispensable to the rest of us as
26
well."
Critics find Bok's proposals for ethics codes and similar
voluntary standards to be an uncertain guide to those who might
7
wish to stamp out lying in society."1
Mandatory codes of ethics
and disclosure policies do go some way to encouraging candor, but
do not, in themselves, guarantee compliance. For instance, a
person may choose to lie and bear the punishment or may find a
reason to justify (perhaps even glorify) noncompliance as a morally
virtuous choice. In such cases, there is little punitive sanctions
can do to shape or reform the prohibited conduct.
122. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Virtuous Lying: A Critique of QuasiCategoricalMoralism, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 433 (1999).
123. Id.
124. BOK, supra notes 116, 117.
125. Sissela Bok, Rethinking the WHO Definition of Health 9 (Harvard
Center for Population and Dev. Studies Working Paper Series Volume 14, No.
7 2004) (pointing out dangers of totalitarian definitions of terms such as

"complete social well-being").

126. Sissela Bok, Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors
Journalism Credibility Project: On Credibility (April 1, 1998), available at

http://www.asne.org.
127. An example of this type of criticism may be found in Margaret Battin's

review of Bok's contribution to a book in which Gerald Dworkin and R.G. Frey
contribute essays in favor of euthanasia, while Bok argues against the
practice. Battin argues that Bok's arguments are essentially a "slippery-slope
set of concerns about social effects" and "not fully persuasive." She notes that
the slippery-slope argument assumes "predictive empirical issues" which,

without evidence, she finds to be "unreliable" and that such arguments "tend

to block out other major concerns that should be regarded as central too... "
Margaret Battin, On the Structure of the Euthanasia Debate: Observations
Provoked by a Near-Perfect For-and-Against Book, 25 J. HEALTH POLITICS,
POL'Y AND LAW 415, 421-22 (2000).
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However, it is not Bok's proposed solution that interests me
so much as her explanation of the difference between lying and
secrecy and the manner in which she conveys the social
consequences of these actions in a network of relationships.'
Bok
argues that one of the stumbling blocks in the path of those who
are uneasy with lying and deception is the practical
acknowledgment that telling the whole truth and nothing but the
truth is "out of reach."'29 She sees the preoccupation with truth as
the reason why lying is a problematic topic both for those who
believe that their religious or political beliefs give them access to
the complete truth (thus justifying lies in the name of that truth)
and for those who are skeptics and do not believe there is any
truth at all (you will never get there, so why bother?). 3 ° But she
argues that "this fact has very little to do with our choices about
whether to lie or to speak honestly, about what to say and what to
hold back."'3' These choices, she says, can be articulated and
evaluated.
Bok argues forcefully that a lack of attention to applied ethics
reduces our understanding of the moral dimensions of human life
and the way in which humans treat each other. Instead, we
should acknowledge that "it is possible to go beyond the notion
that epistemology is somehow prior to ethics" or the notion that
one's personal access to truth
may be so privileged as to justify any
132
lie that serves the truth.
B. Ethical Perspectives in Application: Minimizing the Confusion
The concept of applied ethics recalibrates the problem of the
incomprehensible SPD. If, as Aristotle, Aquinas and Bok all
suggest, the "best" life is a life that tends towards the good and
allows others to follow in the same direction, inaccuracies whether outright lies, omissions of important facts or simple
miscommunications - will detract from the pursuit of happiness
for all who are affected by them. A writer's lies will distract not
only his reader but also himself from the pursuit of the good and
will fray the social fabric for both.133 If the ultimate happiness of
128. BOK, supra note 116, at 82-83.
129. Id. at 4.
130. Id. at 6-7.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 13.
133. Bok's reflections on the death of the French writer Simone Weil are
illustrative on this point. In sympathy with the "victims of war, oppression,
poverty and disease," Weil refused to eat, finally causing her own death (a
conclusion reached by the coroner who examined her body). During the
months leading to her death, however, Weil composed letters to her parents
that spoke favorably of British food and kept them from the news of the dire
consequences of her refusal to eat. Bok's portrait of Weil, while sympathetic,
makes it clear that this strategy was tantamount to lying and cause profound
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all depends upon the common pursuit of the virtuous life, then it
makes sense to lessen the opportunity costs of doing good and
increase the punitive effect of doing wrong. From a social ethics
standpoint, we might ask how the process of writing SPDs can be
changed so that writing an accurate and comprehensible SPD is
the most efficient and simple choice.
To adopt an Aristotelian conceit, consider the possibility that
a lengthy and intricate SPD might be akin to boasting, while a
barebones approach replete with disclaimers suggests false
modesty.
For example, assume you have a fifty-page plan
document in front of you and that the terms it contains are all
correct. Let us go further and assume (this is not remotely
possible) that the document fully explains every aspect of the plan,
including the effect of prevailing market forces. Boasting might
aggrandize the terms of the plan and the importance of reiterating
every detail. However, empirical research has shown us that this
approach - as Aristotle might have predicted - simply leaves
most participants confused.
Aquinas might go further and
question whether a boastful SPD is even truthful.
Neither extreme responds fully to the aspiration underlying
ERISA's disclosure requirements.
An SPD that contains
numerous disclaimers also suggests that anything short of
photocopying that document is inaccurate. Along these lines, false
modesty suggests that it does not really matter how one convey
this information to participants, because one must always guard
against the possibility that they might conclude that the plan
provides more than it really does.
Neither of these extremes fulfills the mandates of ERISA.
What Aristotelian philosophy might describe as the "mean"
between these positions emerges in ERISA's exhortations of
fiduciary obligations. The guiding principle of ERISA is that
fiduciaries must act in the best interest of the participants of.a
plan. In terms of communicating plan terms, the statute is quite
clear: An average participant must be able to understand. From
an Aristotelian perspective, one might view this mandate as a call
to practical virtue.

distress for Weil's inconsolable parents.
Bok notes that Weil's "preoccupation" with "self-abnegation" required, ironically, "that her focus stay on
herself." The lies served Weil's purposes but not without imposing a cost on
the social circles in which she lived. Such a lapse in a person of Weil's stature
reinforces how difficult it can be to pursue a thoroughly moral life. Bok writes,
"[an exemplary life is one we find astonishing, not because it is in some sense
perfect from a moral point of view but because it is lived in the belief that it
matters to think through how one should live, what goals one should strive for,
and what it would mean to take them seriously." Sissela Bok, "No One to
Receive It"?: Simone Weil's Unforeseen Legacy, 12 COMMON KNOWLEDGE 252
(2006).
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III. UNIFORMITY AND UNDERSTANDING

"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful
tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor
less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so
many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master that's all."
- LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS.

In the broadest terms, this Article calls for a conscious effort
on the part of plan sponsors and plan administrators to create
SPDs that will add to trust in the workplace by providing
transparent and understandable explanation of employee benefit
plans. Yet the practical difficulties summarized in the first part of
this Article are likely to be with us as long as an employer's
decision to offer benefits remains voluntary and primarily
responsive to the needs and aspirations of each individual
workplace. ERISA continues to charge plan administrators with
the responsibility for drafting SPDs and plan participants are
unlikely to achieve higher rates of literacy than the American
population in general.
When the normative values of trust and veracity are applied
in a workplace setting, an obvious goal emerges for those involved
in human resources administration.
Social trust suggests
conditions that allow plan administrators and participants to
reach a common understanding of the ties that bind them - in
this case, the employee benefit plan as described by the SPD.
The adoption of standardized definition of key terms whether mandated by government or motivated by industry norms
- may assist consumers in developing an understanding of the
terms used in SPDs. For example, standardized terms are used in
commercial law for the purpose of improving consumer
understanding concerning warranties.'34
Definitions of terms
relevant to employee benefits could likewise be standardized,
either at the behest of the government or through industry
responsiveness to consumer concerns.
Many examples of
potentially useful definitions are available from a wide variety of
sources.
In some cases, for example, individual insurance companies
have adopted uniform definitions of terms that are in widespread
134. See, e.g., The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (2000) (attempting to federalize and
standardize warranty law).
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usage in the policies that insure the benefits under some plans or
in the documents developed for the self-insured plans that the
insurance company administers.
For example, the term
"experimental" is often used to describe the conditions under
which certain medical procedures may be excluded from coverage
in an employee health plan. A single insurance carrier may
actually insure or serve as the third-party administrator for a
large number of employers. By adopting a uniform definition of
"experimental" in its insurance products and encouraging the use
of the same definition in self-insured plans that it administers, the
insurance carrier also encourages a common understanding of the
term.
While there is some sense in which the increasing
uniformity of insurance policies suggests an organic, grassroots
trend towards creating common definitions, serious consideration
must be given to the wisdom of concentrating such a degree of
unregulated discretion in the hands of private entities like
insurance companies.
Insurance companies are hardly
disinterested parties when it comes to the payment of employee
benefits.
An alternative source for uniform definitions might be found
among voluntary industry associations that are focused
specifically on supporting human resource professionals who are
charged with the administration of employee benefit plans. While
it is unlikely that such associations are completely free of bias,
their specific interests in employee benefits policy may be more
diffuse than the financial implications of individual insurance
providers.
In February 2006, the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners charged its Consumer Protection
Working Group to "develop minimum guidelines for the
development and implementation of effective disclosures as well as
standards to use in assessing disclosure effectiveness."135 The
same charge also urged the working group to identify "situations
where disclosure is not reasonable or sufficient consumer
protection."136 In addition, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners provides Model Laws on many topics that could
serve as the basis for state regulation or, in the alternative, as
drafting guidelines for sponsors of private plans. 3
Both insurance companies and voluntary associations will
135. National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Proposal for the
Development of Minimum Guidelines for Consumer Disclosures, NAIC, Feb.
27, 2006, httpJ/www.naic.org (last visited Apr. 23, 2007); see also National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, 2007 Charges to Committees, NAIC,
Dec. 10, 2006, http'J/www.naic.org/documents/committeesCharges.pdf. (last
visited Apr. 23, 2007).
136. Proposal,supra note 135.
137. See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Model
Regulation Service, NAIC,
(Oct. 2006), http://www.naic.org/documents/
committees modelslindex.pdf (last visited May 9, 2007).
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likely influence the development of "best practices" in employee
The best practices concept, which
benefits administration.
encourages the voluntary adoption of uniform standards for
conducting business, is familiar to business professionals. 38
Both federal and state governments serve as additional
sources for the promulgation of uniform terms. Congress already
provides the barebones of definitions in the statutes that impact
employee benefit plans. The administrative agencies that oversee
employee benefits regulation have issued scores of model plan
amendments and trust language that creates uniformity. For
example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics National Compensation
Survey uses specific standardized definitions of health insurance
terms that are reviewed periodically by the federal government's
Interdepartmental Committee on Employment-based Health
Insurance Survey.9 At the state level, detailed legislation and
regulation concerning the content of insurance policies also set
eventually become
forth usable
definitions that could
standardized. 4 '
Clearly, a decision to use standardized terms would raise
numerous practical questions - which terms? whose definitions?
what kind of enforcement? - to name just a few. I do not mean to
dismiss the difficulty of answering these questions or
implementing the answers. In addition, consumer experience with
the standardization of warranty terms under the Magnuson-Moss
Act has not been an unqualified success. 4 ' While the terms that
are used by the Magnuson-Moss Act - full and limited warranty
- are in frequent use in commercial transactions involving
consumers, the consumer's ability to understand the subtleties of
However, simply because
these terms remains unclear.'

138. See, e.g., Boris Kozolchyk, The UNIDROIT Principlesas a Model for the
Unification of the Best ContractualPracticesin the Americas, 46 AM. J. COMP.
L. 151 (Winter, 1998) (examining several specific elements of best practices
ideas); Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric,
Light Reform (And it Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (Spring, 2003)
(reporting on the European best practices system as a model for American
reform); Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's
Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975
(suggesting a best practices approach to securities regulation).
139. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Definitions of Health
Insurance Terms, http://stats.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/healthterms.pdf (last visited
May 10, 2007).
140. See, e.g., Illinois Insurance Code, 215 I.L.C.S. 5/2 (2006) (containing
definitions of relevant insurance terms); New York Insurance Code, NY CLS
Ins. § 107 (2006) (standardizing definitions of insurance terms).
Commission
Warranty-Federal
Trade
141. See
Magnuson-Moss
Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2000).
142. See generally Michael J. Wisdom, An Empirical Study of the MagnusonMoss Warranty Act, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1117 (1979); Ellen M. Moore & F. Kelly
Shuptrine, Warranties: Continued Readability Problems after the 1975
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consumers have encountered problems with the implementation of
programs such as the Magnuson-Moss Act does not mean that
similar education efforts are bound to fail in the employee benefits
arena.
In a larger sense, standardization of terms responds to the
concerns that language may be manipulated or misunderstood in a
way that breaches the trust between the plan administrator and
It is not impossible to deceive or to
the plan participant.
are set forth in
when communications
misunderstand
standardized language, but the use of clear and universal
terminology certainly creates one more protective barrier between
the reader and the possibility of deception or confusion. If, as
Sissela Bok argues, social trust is an imperative goal for those who
aspire to an ethically grounded society, then using standardized
language is one small step in that direction.

Magnuson-Moss WarrantyAct, 27 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 23 (1993).

